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FACTORS INFLUENCING




W HEN an aircraft disaster involves parties or events touching more
than one state, some of the primary considerations, both in time
and importance, to be considered involve the choice of the forum. In
addition to the myriad of customary problems of venue, the attorney
responsible for claims resulting from an aircraft crash must carefully
analyze the facts of the case along with the law of several possible forum
states in order to select the forum most likely to afford the survivors,
both passengers and heirs, the greatest opportunity to receive just com-
pensation. By one choice of forum the plaintiff may bring the "most
significant contacts" rule of conflict of laws into operation rather than
lex loci delicti, thereby choosing a rule of law which could conceivably
be decisive of the final outcome of the litigation. Other factors which
may influence the choice of the forum include: (1) the possible ap-
plication of strict liability or res ipsa loquitur; (2) the possible appli-
cation of a guest statute; and (3) the possible vicarious liability of the
owner, such as a fixed base operator who, although physically absent
from the airplane, may be deemed to be operating it. Consideration must
also be given to the scope of discovery available in one forum as com-
pared with another. Adjectival law as well as substantive law problems
may enter into the decision, particularly in reference to what evidence is
admissible, what presumptions arise, whether presumptions persist despite
proof to the contrary and finally go to the jury with the opposing evi-
dence or whether the "bursting bubble" view prevails.
When suit is filed in a federal district court, that court under Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins' will ordinarily apply the substantive law of the
state in which it sits. When the action is filed in a federal court and then
* J.D., DePaul University Law School 1932. Attorney, Chicago, Ill.
1304 U.S. 64 (1938). See also Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945);
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Fidelity Union Co. v. Field,
311 U.S. 169 (1940).
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transferred under section 1407' or section 1404(a),' because it is part
of multi-district litigation under Van Dusen v. Barrack," the court will
apply the state law of the district in which the action was originally
commenced.
At this early juncture, mention should be made of the common objec-
tion that these factors tend to promote forum shopping. A certain ele-
ment of choice is available, at least to the extent that there are several
appropriate states in which the action can be brought. However, to
charge forum shopping is to challenge the very nature of the federal
system which creates sovereign states, each having diverse rules of sub-
stantive tort law. It has long been settled that claimants are entitled to
select their forum, within rules, and bring an action wherever the
defendants can be found and served. Therefore, in the Erie sense there
is no forum shopping present when an injured claimant chooses to file
his claim in a jurisdiction providing favorable rules of law.'
'28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1970): Multidistrict litigation.
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact
are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any
district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers
shall be made by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation authorized
by this section upon its determination that transfers for such proceedings
will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the
just and efficient conduct of such actions. Each action so transferred shall
be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial
proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall
have been previously terminated: Provided, however, that the panel may
separate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third party claim and
remand any of such claims before the remainder of the action is re-
manded.
' 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970): Change of Venue.
For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice,
a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or di-
vision where it might have been brought.
4 376 U.S. 612 (1964). The law of the original forum state in which plaintiff filed
suit would be applied even though the case was subsequently transferred to a district
with conflicting state law.
'Concerning plaintiff's ability to select the most favorable forum, the Illinois
Supreme Court has observed:
'There is nothing which requires a plaintiff to whom such a choice is
given to exercise it in a self-denying or large-hearted manner. There is
nothing to restrain use of that privilege as all choices of tribunal are com-
monly used by all plaintiffs to get away from judges who are considered
to be unsympathetic and to get before those who are considered more
favorable; to get away from juries thought to be small-minded in the
matter of verdicts and to get to those thought to be generous; to escape
courts whose procedures make the going easy.' [Quoting Justice Robert
Jackson, concurring in Miles v. Illinois Central R.R., 315 U.S. 698, 705
(1942)] If it is 'shopping' for a plaintiff to bring a suit in a great metrop-
olis where a large verdict is anticipated, why is it not also 'shopping' for
a defendant to attempt to have the case dismissed on the ground that it
should have been brought in a small community where the defendant an-
ticipates a smaller verdict would result. This is in accord with the reason-
ing of Judge Hand in his concurring opinion in Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan,
182 F.2d 329, (an anti-trust suit under Title 15 of the U.S. Code, which
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An aircraft crash case, more than other types of tort cases, raises
numerous choice-influencing considerations before the lawsuit is filed.
These considerations may extend to rules of pleading and proof which
may differ from state to state, thereby affording claimants a better oppor-
tunity for success in one state than in another. Usually, however, these
rules are the same for most states (such as application of evidentiary or
discovery rules) or are insignificant. Nevertheless, several significant
considerations remain and a mistake as to any one could disastrously
preclude any recovery by the claimant. This article will discuss these
considerations.
II. THE AVAILABILITY OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
The selection of the most appropriate forum may well have a decisive
bearing on the prospect of ultimate recovery as well as the amount of
recovery. Because an air crash catastrophically causes destruction of the
aircraft and loss of life, proof of the cause of the crash, if possible at all,
often depends on circumstantial evidence. In this situation one forum
may apply res ipsa loquitur and consider the case as presenting a ques-
tion of fact for a jury, while another forum may hold the case insufficient
to go to the jury. Obviously the difference could be decisive.
The federal forum is available if there is diversity of citizenship6 or if
the claim is based upon the Federal Tort Claims Act,' in which case it
must be brought in the federal court. If the action is based upon the
Death on the High Seas Act,8 it will be brought in admiralty in the fed-
law contains a venue provision comparable to 6 of the F.E.L.A.), where
he said (p. 332): 'I wish to put my vote solely upon the ground that 15
of Title 15 gives to plaintiff a privilege which a defendant must overcome
by more than a bare balance of convenience between the two forums.'
Cotton v. Louisville & N.R.R., 14 Ill.2d 144, 148; 152 N.E. 2d 385, 389(1958).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970): Diversity of citizenship; amount in controversy; costs.
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-
(a) citizens of different States;
(b) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof;
and
(c) citizens of different States and in which foreign states or citizens
or subjects thereof are additional parties.
7 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970): United States as defendant
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts,
together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal
Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money
damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within
the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accord with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
846 U.S.C. § 761 (1970): Right of action; where and by whom brought
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act,
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eral court. However, in many instances there is no adequate ground for
federal jurisdiction, and the claimant is limited to the state court forum.
In whatever forum he proceeds, the claimant may wish to rely on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Moreover, several jurisdictions allow the
use of doctrine for the simple reason that specific acts of negligence often
may not be provable.
One of the earliest cases to apply res ipsa loquitur couched the decision
in terms of common carriers. In Smith v. Pennsylvania Central Airlines
Corp.' a commercial airline flew into a mountain in West Virginia while
en route from Pittsburg to Washington, D.C. A complaint was filed in
federal court charging specific negligence but also relied upon the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur. The court held that it was bound to follow the
laws of the state in which the accident occurred and, in the absence of
any state law in point, would attempt to ascertain the applicable law
with the aid of such persuasive authorities as "are available." The court
held that the doctrine would be applicable to accidents involving air-
planes operating as common carriers, notwithstanding contentions that
the cause of this airplane accident may not be ascertainable. The de-
fense argument that, since the CAB conducts an inquiry into every air-
craft disaster and embodies its findings in a public report, the plaintiff
and the defendant are in parity in respect to access to information as to
the causes of the catastrophe was rejected. Noting that the majority of
reported cases had concluded that res ipsa loquitur is applicable to acci-
dents occurring on airplanes operating as common carriers, the court
further observed that none of the cases in which the courts had declined
to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to airplane accidents, with the
exception of Smith v. Whitley," involved a common carrier; i.e., in each
instance the plane was either a private plane or on a test flight. More
recently, in Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.," where a Douglas DC-7C
on a flight from McChord Air Force Base near Seattle, Washington, to
Elmendorf, A.F.B., Alaska, crashed into the ocean, the court upheld the
application of res ipsa loquitur by the trial court where there was no
specific evidence as to the cause of the crash. About 1,500 pounds of
the wreckage identified as being from the aircraft, including life vests
still encased in their plastic containers and extremely deformed seat
neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league
from the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories
or dependencies of the United States, the personal representative of the
decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of the
United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's
wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative against the vessel, per-
son, or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued.
176 F. Supp. 940 (D.D.C. 1948) (applying law of West Virginia).
10223 N.C. 534, 27 S.E.2d 442 (1943).
11 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967).
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frames, was recovered. None of the bodies of the crew or passengers
were recovered. The application of res ipsa loquitur was upheld on the
theory that the instrumentality which produced the death was under the
exclusive control and management of the defendant airline and that the
occurrence in question was such as does not ordinarily occur in the
absence of negligence. There was no possible contributing conduct by
the decedent Cox. The reviewing court said the application of res ipsa
loquitur was warranted though not compelled." The cogent opinion in
Des Marais v. Beckman1 affirmed a District Court award of damages by
application of res ipsa loquitur. The court expressly held that where
there is "equality of ignorance," the rule precluding application of the
doctrine when parties possess equal knowledge of the cause is inapplic-
able.
In Blumenthal v. United States" a civilian lost his life after bailing out
of a disabled military aircraft over international waters between Korea
and Japan. The bail-out of all passengers had followed the loss of one
engine of the airplane. The trial court held that res ipsa loquitur was
applicable because the respondent failed to explain satisfactorily either
the malfunction of the propeller or the loss of the engine. The court of
appeals expressed the view that the aircraft was under the exclusive
management and control of the respondent and held that the facts and
circumstances surrounding the occurrence justified application of the
rules of res ipsa loquitur1 After Southeastern Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd,"8
there is little question that the courts generally follow the view that an
aircrash is not an ordinary occurrence. In this instance the court reasoned
that in the last decade the progress of aviation has been such that it has
now become an ordinary mode of transportation that is as safe or safer
than other modes of transportation. This premise leads to the court's
conclusion that airplane accidents do not happen in the ordinary course
of things if those who have control use proper care. Therefore, the court
indicated the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to aviation
accidents."
Where there are dual controls in private aircraft cases, there may be
doubt whether the court will apply res ipsa loquitur in the absence of
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was in control of the
1See also Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233 (1913); Haasman v. Pacific, Alaska Air
Express, 100 F. Supp. 1 (D. Alaska, 1951); Des Marais v. Beckman, 198 F.2d 550
(9th Cir. 1952).
13 198 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1952). See Haasman v. Pacific Alaska Air Express, 100
F. Supp. 1 (D. Alaska, 1951).
14 306 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1962). The initial action was brought in admiralty under
the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1970).
1See Wiegand v. Pennsylvania R.R., 276 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1959).
16209 Tenn. 639, 355 S.W.2d 436 (1962).
17 See generally Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 528 (1949).
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aircraft."' Where the owner is a licensed pilot, C.F.R. 60.2 provides that
the pilot in command of the aircraft shall be directly responsible for, and
have final authority over, the aircraft's operation."' However, the fact of
dual controls did not prevent application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur in Vollins v. Stroh,"° where the owner of the plane was aboard
and had the right to control the flight. When all mechanical failures can
be eliminated as possible causes by the CAB examination, courts should
and do hold that a reasonable inference could arise that human fault
was the cause and recovery could be based upon res ipsa loquitur. In
Snethen v. Gomez," a somewhat backward looking case, proof was
offered for the purpose of rebutting any inferences which might reason-
ably arise from the facts of the occurrence. When the plaintiff offered
proof of specific acts of negligence, the court held that the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur was no longer available because evidence of specific
negligence had been introduced. Many courts following the modem
trend will permit the case to go to the jury both on res ipsa loquitur and
with proof of specific negligence so that the jury can determine whether
it believes specific negligence was proved." If it is concluded that specific
negligence was not proved, the jury may then properly rest its verdict
upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It is regrettable that some courts
still hold that once specific negligence is proved the plaintiff must make
an election as to whether he will rely upon either specific negligence or
res ipsa loquitur, but that he cannot rely upon both. The danger and
unfairness to the claimant under that view lurks in the fact that the jury
may not believe the proof of specific negligence. Any rule which deters
a party from proving the truth is not a good rule. For that reason one
must favor the view which permits the claimant who has sufficient evi-
dence of specific negligence to go to the jury to rely both on specific
negligence and res ipsa loquitur when the facts so warrant.
For example, in Farrell v. Topp," applying Arkansas law, the court
moved away from the older cases holding that res ipsa loquitur could
not be applied to impose liability in a dual control situation. The owner
of the airplane was at the controls, with the decedent passenger in the
other seat, equally in position to operate the plane. The court held that
11L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW 178 (1963), expressing the author's
view that the better, more recent cases are more liberal in permitting recovery in dual
control cases.
"See Lange v. Nelson-Ryan Flight Service, Inc., 259 Minn. 460, 108 N.W.2d 428
(1961).
20 426 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. App. 1968).
21432 P.2d 914 (Ariz. App. 1967).
22See, e.g., Di Mare v. Cresci, 58 Cal.2d 292, 373 P.2d 860 (1962); Loketch v.
Capital Transit Co., 248 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Abbott v. Page Airways, 23
N.Y.2d 502, 245 N.E.2d 388 (1969); Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 791 (1954).
21386 S.W.2d 33 (Mo. 1964).
CHOICE OF FORUM
the evidence justified a finding that the owner was operating the airplane
when it crashed.
Lightenburger v. Gordon" involved a variety of questions of particular
interest in a light airplane crash case in which all occupants of the air-
plane died. The owner of the airplane and the bodies of three other
passengers were recovered from the burned aircraft after the crash. The
owner's body was in the left front seat, the one usually occupied by the
pilot. He was the only person aboard certified as a pilot. The verdict for
the defendant was reversed and remanded for a new trial because the
trial court erred in giving an instruction and in excluding the opinion
evidence of investigators who examined the aircraft following the crash.
The airplane had been about to land when it suddenly banked to the left,
crashed, and burned. Issues of disorientation were argued, and there was
a dispute as to conditions of visibility. The reviewing court held that the
trial court erred in excluding opinion evidence that there had not been
failure of a critical component of the aircraft prior to the crash and also
erred in excluding the testimony of CAB investigators that the com-
ponents of the airplane examined by them following the crash were
capable of normal operations prior to the impact. Although this opinion
was held to be admissible, the reviewing court indicated that more ac-
ceptable terminology, in response to a proper question, would have been
"the examination of the wreckage showed no evidence of operational
stress" or "that the damage in every instance could be attributed to im-
pact or fire."' The court also noted that it did not consider whether the
statement of opinion violated the provisions of the Civil Aeronautics
Act, 49 U.S.C. section 1441 (e) " because the objection was not on that
ground. The testimony contained no opinions or conclusions as to the
cause of the accident. The special concurring opinion which disagreed
with the reasons given by the majority for reversal and remand expressed
the view that the statements in question were more nearly an opinion
than a statement of fact and therefore barred by the Act despite the fact
that such an objection apparently had not been raised by the defendant
in the trial court.
It would be a rare case in which the plaintiff could not discover any
cause of the crash. If physical examination of debris reveals some negli-
gence, it is an essential element of the truth-seeking process that such
evidence be shown to a jury. However, just as it is rare that no evidence
of negligence can be found, often only the most minimal proof of negli-
24407 P.2d 728 (1965).
23Id. at 730.
2849 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (1970): Use of records and reports as evidence
No part of any report or reports of the Board relating to any accident
or the investigation thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used in any
suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in such
report or reports.
1971]
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gence can be made from charred or destroyed debris. When this is so,
no plaintiff should be precluded from offering this small quantum of
evidence and also calling on the jury to rely on reasonable inferences of
negligence unless rebutted by the defense. If, therefore, the plaintiff is to
be allowed the benefit of whatever inferences the jury might draw,
Farrell, Lightenburger and numerous other cases can be understood to
provide the plaintiff with the opportunity to have the jury consider all
available information even though circumstantial and insufficient to
prove specific negligence.
Finally, as illustrated by Lightenburger, another factor which may
serve as additional input on one side or the other in attempting to deter-
mine the best court in which to bring the action, is what evidence will
be admissible in a given jurisdiction on the issues of liability and dam-
ages. If the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence go into effect, opening
the door even wider than it now is for the admissibility of hearsay and
giving the court very broad discretion in this area, the federal forum, in
certain situations, may become a more attractive one. The adoption of
the rules, and it may be anticipated that this will soon occur, may lead
many states, as they did in connection with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, to adopt similar uniform rules of evidence in their courts.
III. CHOICE OF FORUM: PROOF OF PILOT IN CONTROL
In the foregoing section, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was discussed,
in part as it applied to permitting a jury to draw the inference of who
was in control of the aircraft when it crashed. This application becomes
unnecessary if the forum state statutorily draws the inference or creates
a presumption of pilot control." The Ohio legislature has attempted to
deal rationally with the problem of proof where the identity of the pilot
was uncertain. The statute is particularly helpful in the dual control
situation. The Ohio Revised Code, section 4561.23, Presumption of Pilot
in Command, provides that the "pilot in command" is rebuttably pre-
sumed to be:
(a) The occupant of the left front seat in airplanes having side-by-side
and fore-and-aft seating;
(b) The occupant of the left seat of an airplane which has only one
transverse seat;
(c) In a tandem seated airplane, the occupant of the seat recommended
by the manufacturer of such airplane when the airplane is flown solo;
217 Such a statute purports merely to control the evidentiary question of how control
is proved. The forum state's statute should apply even though the substantive law of
some other state may also be applied as to one or more other questions, because
evidentiary questions, in conflicts of laws analysis, have traditionally and are presently
most often regarded as procedural and therefore governed by the law of the forum
state. See 5 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 43.02 (2d ed. 1969); Green, The Admis-
sibility of Evidence Under the Federal Rules, 55 HARV. L. REV. 197 (1941).
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(d) Notwithstanding divisions (a), (b), and (c) of this section, the
occupant of the airplane possessed of an instructor's rating is rebuttably
presumed to be the pilot-in-command when any part of the flight is for
the purpose of instructing another in any phase of flying or navigating;
(e) Notwithstanding divisions (a), (b), (c) and (d) of this section, in
all flights conducted under instrument flight rules, the pilot-in-command
is rebuttably presumed to be the pilot whose name appears on the
flight plan;
(f) In the event that the occupants and their positions in the airplane at
the time of the crash cannot be established otherwise from the evidence
with reasonable certainty, it is presumed that the airplane was being
flown at the time of the crash, and immediately prior thereto, by the
person occupying the pilot-in-command seat, as designated above, during
or immediately before take-off. 8
This statute makes good sense. It codifies those elements of evidence,
proof of which, as a matter of common sense, justify the conclusion that
the pilot-in-command was flying the airplane. Such an approach by the
Ohio legislature and by the courts is also philosophically consistent with
the practicality of our law makers, judicial or legislative, in accepting as
sufficient the highest and best proof that can be made in any given case,
particularly in death cases where eyewitnesses are often not available.
Practitioners faced with identifying the pilot-in-command without the
assistance of a statute similar to the one in Ohio should carefully consider
the following factors which tend to prove the identity of the actual pilot
in the dual control situation:
1. Identity of alleged pilot in control as owner;
2. Possession of license by alleged pilot in control;
3. Nonlicensing of other occupant or other occupants of plane;
4. Asserted pilot in control was the "pilot-in-command" of the flight;
5. Flying experience of the alleged pilot in control as contrasted with
the inexperience of other occupant or occupants of the plane;
6. Observed maneuvers of the plane during flight compared with the
known flight habits of the asserted pilot in control;
7. Contrast between observed maneuvers of plane and flight habits of
other occupants of plane who have had flight experience;
8. Pilot's previous habit of controlling during entire flight;
9. Mechanical set-up prohibiting control and take-off or landing by
one other than alleged pilot in control;
10. Seating of alleged pilot in control in position customarily oc-
cupied by pilot operating plane;
11. Alleged pilot in control observed at controls at each take-off and
landing during flight;
12. Giving and receiving of signals on take-off by alleged pilot in
control;
2OHIo REV. CIV. STAT. 4561.23 (1965).
1971]
THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
13. Voice on land radio seeking instructions from control tower, or
like personnel, identified as that of alleged pilot in control;
14. Owner's or pilot's agreement with airport not to permit other
pilots to operate plane or not to give flight instruction; and
15. Post-crash circumstances such as the position of the bodies and
combination of the controls."
In addition, the case of Schumacher v. Swartz,"° presents one novel
approach, not mentioned above, for determining the identity of the
actual pilot. The court found that the owner and not the passenger was
in exclusive control of the plane at the time of the crash because the
testimony showed that the owner's flying style was abrupt, sharp and
characterized by quick maneuvering, whereas the deceased passenger's
style was exceptionally conservative, cautious, gentle and smooth.
It is apparent, therefore, that the imaginative attorney, in addition to
reliance on res ipsa loquitur, has available either statutory or circum-
stantial evidence to assist in proving aircraft control. The point here, as
elsewhere in this paper, is that counsel must examine the law of each
available forum to determine where the lawsuit can be most advantage-
ously brought for the client.
IV. CHOICE OF FORUM: LIABILITY OF AIRCRAFT OWNER AS OPERATOR
Aircraft crashes most commonly leave the catastrophic result of a
badly maimed occupant and leave family survivors without the support
of the "breadwinner." As between the innocent passenger or survivors
and the presumably negligent pilot or owner, it can be reasonably con-
cluded that the loss should not fall on the former. When the modern
availability of insurance is considered, any balance of equities between
operators of aircraft and passengers or survivors disappears. This is not
to say that insurance carriers must absolutely bear all aircraft losses;
rather, the thoughtful and humanitarian analyst should readily realize
that where the risk has been insured against, such protection most likely
will be carried by the owner, somewhat less likely by the pilot, rarely by
the passenger and virtually never by the survivor.
Given the foregoing circumstances, between the survivors and an
owner who may not even be the actual pilot, it is a desirable social policy
to treat the owner as operator and impose on him the burden of ade-
29 Speiser, Light Aircraft Litigation, 13 AM. JuR. TRIALS 103 at 743-44 (1967).
See also Krause, Dual Control Plane Crashes, TRIAL AND TORT TRENDS 237 (1965
Belli Seminar); Davis, Use of Insurance Policy and Proof of Loss in Solving the Dual
Control Problem, ATLA CONY. PROC., 20th Ann. Cony., Av. L. Sec. (1966); Owner-
ship of Aircraft, Ownership as Proof of Why Was Flying a Dual Controlled Aircraft,
2 AM. JuR. P.O.F., Supp. Proof No. 3, cited in Speiser, supra note 29.
0 68 Pa. D. & C. 3 (Phila. Ct. of C.P. 1948).
CHOICE OF FORUM
quately insuring aircraft operations which he authorizes and from which
he usually derives profit.
Many states have passed statutes which appear to impose liability on
the fixed based operator as the owner or bailor of the aircraft even though
the airplane is not being flown by his agent, servant or employee. These
statutes provide in substance that any person who causes or authorizes
the operation of an aircraft, whether with or without the right of legal
control (in the capacity of owner, lessee or otherwise) of the aircraft,
shall be deemed to be engaged in the operation of the aircraft within the
meaning of the particular act. This type of statutory provision exemplified
by 49 U.S.C. section 1301 (26)," after which comparable state statutes
have been patterned, has been held in Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying
Service, Inc." not to impose such liability on the owner-bailor. Several
states, however, including New Hampshire," Iowa' and Mississippi,'
having such statutes, have construed them as imposing liability on the
owner-bailor as though the pilot were his agent, servant or employee.
Hays v. Morgan," for example, was distinguished in Rogers because Hays
relied on an applicable state statute. Absent a state statute which would
impose liability, the court held that the federal statute did not impose
liability on the owner-bailor for the negligence or improper control by
the pilot. One explanation of this divergent interpretation of the same
basic statute is that federal courts feel no compulsion to interpret the
congressional act broadly to impose liability" whereas state courts may
seek to interpret the same wording liberally to grant relief to their in-
jured citizens.
V. CHOICE OF FORUM: APPLICATION OF "GUEST ACT"
Thirty or more states, by statute or court decision, preclude liability
3149 U.S.C. S 1301(26) (1970):
Definitions
As used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:
'Operation of aircraft' or 'operate aircraft' means the use of aircraft,
for the purpose of air naviagtion and includes the navigation of aircraft.
Any person who causes or authorizes the operation of aircraft, whether
with or without the right of legal control (in the capacity of owner,
lessee, or otherwise) of the aircraft, shall be deemed to be engaged in the
operation of aircraft within the meaning of this chapter.
See also ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 15- , 22.11 (1963).
33435 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 91 Sup. Ct. 1255 (1971).
3 3Hoebee v. Howe, 98 N.H. 168, 97 A.2d 223 (1953).
'
4 Lamaster v. Snodgrass, 248 Iowa 1377, 85 N.W.2d 622 (1957).
' Hays v. Morgan, 221 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1955) (interpreting a Mississippi statute).
36 Id.
'3 Jurisdiction of federal courts, if 49 U.S.C. § 1301(26) (1970) were construed to
impose liability on the owner, would be founded upon article III to the Constitution
and 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970) which grant jurisdiction to cases arising under the
laws of the United States.
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of owners or operators of automobiles to guests unless the conduct of the
operator is more than merely negligent. These statutes generally require
proof that the operator was guilty of willful or wanton misconduct. These
automobile statutes are not applicable to aircraft unless the guest statute
specifically includes aircraft, but many states have enacted statutes pro-
viding that the liability of the operator of an aircraft carrying passengers
(other than common carriers) shall be determined by the rules of law
applicable to torts on land, thereby applying automobile guest rules to
aircraft operation. Other states, for example Illinois," restate the auto-
mobile guest statute in terms of aircraft, thereby providing no right of
action to the guest passenger unless there is willful or wanton miscon-
duct. Therefore, it may become highly important to know whether there
are guest statutes in any of the forums in which the action might be
brought and whether those statutes will be held applicable. Counsel
cannot ignore this question because the result of an error could well deny
recovery altogether.
VI. CHOICE OF FORUM: APPLICATION OF CHOICE OF LAWS RULES
Each of the foregoing considerations has been premised upon litiga-
tion arising from an aircraft which touches more than one state, either
because of the parties or places in which conduct occurred. Perhaps the
most obvious question raised by such a multistate situation is the choice
of law which will be applied to various questions by the forum court.
Evidentiary matters, previously mentioned,39 and pleading problems will
largely be decided according to the law of the forum. However, as im-
portant as those problems might be, what law will the forum court apply
to govern the more prominent substantive questions of liability, negli-
gence or measure of damages? Failure to properly analyze the choice of
law rules of the proposed forum may result in the application of some
state substantive law which denies recovery altogether or severely limits
compensable damages.
The need or importance of determining which wrongful death statute
will apply and in which forum to proceed is illustrated in certain graphic
respects by Richards v. United States.' In that case, the Supreme Court
"ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 151, 22.83 (1963) provides:
No person riding in an aircraft as a guest, without payment for the ride,
nor his personal representative in the event of the death of such guest,
shall have a cause of action against any airman of such aircraft or its
owner or his employee or agent for injury, death or loss, in case of acci-
dent, unless the accident was caused by the wilful and wanton misconduct
of the airman or such aircraft or its owner or his employee or agent and
unless such wilful and wanton misconduct contributed to the injury,
death or loss for which the action is brought.
"Note 26 supra.
40369 U.S. 1 (1962).
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held that under the Federal Tort Claims Act the whole law, including
the choice of laws rules of the state where the negligent act or omission
occurred, was applicable. As the crash in Missouri was alleged to have
resulted from negligence committed in Oklahoma, the Court applied the
whole law of Oklahoma, including its conflicts rule. Oklahoma followed
the rule of lex loci delicti, applying the wrongful death act of the state
where the injury causing death occurred. The Court thereupon applied
the law of Missouri and states that because it is conceded that each
petitioner had recevied $15,000, the maximum amount recoverable
under the Missouri Act, the petitioners had received full compensation
for their claims. The petitioners were seeking additional amounts from
the United States under the Oklahoma Wrongful Death Act which con-
tained no limitation on the amount of recovery. The ruling of the dis-
trict court that the complaints failed to state claims upon which relief
could be granted was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
and the United States Supreme Court.
In some accidents, the wreckage of the plane and the bodies of the
occupants are never found or recovered. One forum might apply res ipsa
loquitur and allow a recovery, whereas another jurisdiction might refuse
to apply the doctrine and deny a recovery. It can therefore become
decisively important to the claimants to attempt to prosecute the action
in a forum which will give the claimants the benefit of the most favorable
law that might be applied to those circumstances.
Detailed analysis of any state's conflict of laws rules is beyond the
scope of this article. It is sufficient to observe that traditional rules such
as Oklahoma's lex loci delicti are in turmoil and are rapidly being re-
placed by more modem theories commonly known as the "significant
contacts approach," "grouping of contacts approach" or "balancing of
interests approach." Counsel must discover the applicable rule of each
potential forum and analyze its effect to determine what state's substan-
tive law that forum will adopt. Moreover, if the most desirable forum
relies on an older unexamined rule, counsel may wish to evaluate the
potential of challenging and changing the forum's conflicts rule.
In resolving the choice of laws problems and in searching for an an-
swer as to the place that had the most significant contact with the parties
or the occurrence, it is well to realize that the courts do not necessarily
apply the law of any one jurisdiction to all issues in the case but may
apply the law of several jurisdictions as a United States district court did
in Manos v. TWA. " Because the district court sat in Illinois, it was
bound to apply Illinois conflict of laws principles.' In doing so, the
court applied the law of Italy, the place where the crash occurred, to
41 295 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. 111. 1969).
"
2See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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determine whether or not a tort had in fact been committed. On the
liability aspect of the action, which was based on an expressed or implied
warranty in the sale of the aircraft, the court applied the law of the state
of Washington where the plane was manufactured and sold, holding that
a manufacturer may be held liable in a passenger death case on the
theory of a breach of an expressed or implied warranty to a consumer
without privity. Washington had adopted the strict liability principle.
Finally, a tortuous problem presented by releases executed by plaintiffs
from California and Arizona which provided that the releases should be
interpreted by the law of California was left to a jury determination of
facts, ignoring the purported submission to California law. Although this
sort of detailed and exhausting analysis may, in fact, be overlooked in
practice, counsel should rigorously consider the manner in which the
proposed forum will resolve each of the conflicts issues, in order not to
deprive the client of any assistance in securing recovery.
CONCLUSION
The trial lawyer's prodigious task in choosing a forum for his client is
evident. In addition to the major inquires posed above, any number of
minor matters may be decided in favor of or adversely to the plaintiffs
depending upon the choice of forum. While most minor matters either
cannot be analyzed before filing, or need not be because minor variances
will not be outcome determinative, no attorney can fulfill his obligation
to the client without carefully considering the major differences between
potential forums. It is no vice to bring the innocent plaintiffs' claim in
an appropriate jurisdiction which affords the best hope of securing an
adequate recovery. Conversely however, it is a great evil to remain blind
to the sovereign distinctions between state law and thereby deny the
client just compensation.
